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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 24/06/2008 Accident number: 583 
Accident time: Not recorded Accident Date: 17/01/2001 
Where it occurred: Helicopter base, San 
Francisco Libre, Nr 
Managua 
Country: Nicaragua 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Other Date of main report: None 
ID original source: RG Name of source: Printed report 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: steep slope 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 24/06/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
 
Accident report 
The details of this accident are taken from the publication "Minas Antipersonal y Desmindo en 
Nicaragua, Avances y Limitaciones" (Antipersonnel mines and demining in Nicaragua, 
Advances and Limitations)  published by Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI), Managua. 
Those details are augmented by an interview with the medic involved. An internal army Board 
of Inquiry report was not made available. This record will be revised if more information 
becomes available. 
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The Medic is a qualified doctor with two years experience in emergency medicine in a 
regional hospital in Rivas, Southern Nicaragua and five years in a major hospital in Managua. 
He applied for the demining work because it had better conditions and pay than the national 
health system. He joined the demining programme on 1 March 1999. US Army advisors and 
trainers were involved. 
 
All demining in Nicaragua is officially done by the army, with OEA observers present. 
 
"According to military records, by January 1999 there had been 12 deaths of military 
personnel and another 78 had suffered injuries during demining activities. "  [Page 15.] 
According to the medic many accidents occurred while moving concrete fence posts and 
fence wires that marked the boundaries of the mined areas and had fallen or been pushed  
on to the mines, Many other accidents occurred while prodding.   
The hospitals which specialise in attending mine victims are Aldo Chavarria [Rehabilitation 
Hospital] and Davila Bolanos Hospital (both in Managua) and the Red Cross. 
The demining teams have an ambulance and medic (fully qualified doctor) and have 
helicopter transport available for transport to hospital.  The helicopter is not on standby but is 
a military helicopter that is made available for hospital transport. As is a small country it is 
unlikely that flight time would be more than 30 minutes each way. 
 
The doctor/Medic interviewed had attended two accidents [See also DDASaccident582].  
 
On 17th January 2001 demining was being conducted around a former helicopter base in San 
Francisco Libre, near Managua.  A deminer stepped on a PMN mine just outside the marked 
area while moving between the front and back of the lane. He was “going to prod” so had 
presumably returned to the back of the lane to remove his metal-detector. 
The Medic reported that there was not much blood. The wound has been cleanly cauterised 
by the heat of the explosion. The Victim’s heel was blown away, and his foot was later 
surgically amputated at the ankle.  Three weeks later [when the Medic was interviewed] the 
Victim had already been released from hospital.  
The Victim was wearing padded over-trousers which may have limited his injuries.  [No further 
information about PPE was made available.] 
The deminers blamed the high wind because the marking tapes were not closely staked. 
Wide spacing was correct according to their SOP but the tape could stretch and get blown 
around, leading to uncertainty about precisely where the edge of the safe area was. As a 
result of the accident, the deminers began to use marking stakes at roughly one metre 
intervals. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 759 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not recorded 
Protection issued: Trousers/leggings 
Not recorded 
Protection used: Trousers/leggings; Not 
recorded 
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Summary of injuries: 
AMPUTATION/LOSS:Leg Below knee 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
This accident is classed as "Other" because the mine was not missed. 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the 
worksite conditions made the marking system inadequate but nothing was done to correct 
this. The secondary cause is listed as a “Management Control Inadequacy” because the 
marking system in use (plastic tape with widely spaced wooden stakes) had been approved 
by senior management and included in SOPs without paying due attention to the climate 
where demining was being conducted. 
The very large number of accidents suffered by this demining group raises questions about 
the quality of their Advisors and training. 
This accident record will be revised if more information becomes available. 
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